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TECHNOLOGY CHANGE: SOURCES AND IMPEDIMENTS
* 
Gustav Ranis, Mallory Irons and Yanjing Huang
** 
 
I.  Introduction 
  The relationship between technology change and economic growth has been of interest to 
economists for centuries, but especially since Robert Solow made his seminal contribution to the 
neoclassical model of economic growth in the 1950s leading to an explosion in the follow-up 
literature.  Interest in technology change waned perceptibly in the ‘80s.  However, with the 
arrival of the “new growth theory” a notable revival of focus on the subject can be noticed. 
Overall, there remains little doubt that there exists a consensus that technology change, both in 
terms of its process and quality dimensions, represents the principal driving force in explaining 
comparative economic performance at both micro and macro levels.  That said, exactly how 
technology change is generated and what impedes it remains less clear.   
The standard neoclassical approach assumes the rate of technological change to be 
exogenously determined.  Solow’s model predicts that rich and poor countries alike will in the 
long term converge to steady rates of growth that are determined by technological progress, the 
savings rate, and the growth of the labor force.  While the model confirms that higher savings 
rates lead to higher rates of growth, capital accumulation takes a back seat to technological 
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ces Stewart recognized 
                                                   
1 This is not to deny that investment is likely to be required to “carry” technology 
change. 
The “new growth theory” attempts to render technology change endogenous and, by 
asserting that externalities permit the maintenance of sustained growth in spite of an increase in 
the rate of investment,
2 thus avoids the diminishing returns to investment issue that troubled
Solow model,   Consequently, endogenous growth theory’ authors have reinvigorated the deba
over the role of technology change in economic growth and have endeavored  to constru
macroeconomic models built upon microeconomic foundations.  The forces that are generally 
seen to give rise to endogenous technological progress include education, research and 
development, external influences and domestic government policies.  While empirical evidence
in support
o date has been to reinvigorate the discussion surrounding the sources of technological 
progress. 
In the context of this renewed contemporary interest surrounding technology change an
economic growth, it seems less useful to differentiate between technology choice and technology 
change, in the recognition that the two are really indistinguishable, i.e. any “choice” is almost 
always modified to render it a “change”.  Technologies are rarely ever successfully taken off the
shelf and deployed as is; rather, a considerable amount of adaptation must inevitably occur in
order for them to be utilized effectively in any given environment. Fran
      
1 Solow, Robert (1956) 







 of a 
haracteristics and alternative organizations of the public sector, that render 
it diffic
                                                       
the importance of the appropriateness of technology early on.  As she put it “what is needed
above all is local technical innovation directed towards local needs.”
3 
A closely related dimension focuses on the links between economic growth, technolo
change, and human development.  Human development and economic growth have been 
analyzed as affecting each other through two “channels”: the first, running from economic 
growth to human development, is fueled by household and government expenditures as w
technology change.  It is not as well understood as the second channel, which runs from 
improvements in human development, is fueled by foreign and domestic savings, as well as, 
once again,  technology, and leads to the enhancement of GDP growth
4.  The first  represents a 
production function converting public and private expenditures on health, education and
nutrition, etc. into increases in life expectancy, reductions in infant mortality, educational 
achievement, and the enhancement of other human capabilities.  This conversion, of course, 
depends on technology, but it has thus far proved harder to understand exactly how technology 
change affects human development.  We do know, for example, that per capita income 
significantly affects life expectancy levels
5 and that human development is positively affected by 
household and government expenditures on health and education.  However, as Behrman has 
carefully, and rather painfully, pointed out, there are many interrelated inputs, including hom
schooling, home health inputs, the distribution of income, nutrition, as well as the relevance
variety of household c
ult to get a good fix on this production function.
6  It reminds one of the problem 
 
3 nology and Underdevelopment  Tech , MacMillan, 1977.  p278.  See also her edited volume Macro-Policies for 
Ap ng propriate Technology in Developi  Countries, Westview Press, 1987. 
4 Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2003 )   
5 P
6 Behrman (1990) 








 multinational corporation, etc.) and 
ternal factors (i.e. domestic patents, research and development, investment, education, etc.  The 
mpirical analysis of six diverse developing countries – Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Taiwan 
ht to bear, demonstrating why the Asian countries seem to have 
e than their Latin American counterparts.  In Section 
ome implications for policy. 
 
encountered early on in properly defining its agricultural  sector counterpart, given multiple 
quantitative inputs and the somewhat  mysterious role of international as well as domestic 
adaptive technology. 
The second production function, linking human development to economic growth, wi
the support of domestic and foreign investment plus, significantly, technology change, is better 
understood and this is where most of the attention of the “new growth theory” literature h
placed to date.  It is in this context that we intend to examine the sources of technology ch
(TFP) and the impediments to the full realization of technological opportunities, both a
and in the context of a comparison among six typologically diverse developing economies.  
Among the sources  of TFP we will examine R&D, investment, various types of patents, FDI
openness,  science and technology (S&T) personnel, and other education-related human 
development indicators.  Among impediments, we will analyze public and private policy 
frameworks that tend to block the realization of existing technological opportunities.  
Throughout, we will focus on the non-agricultural sector.  We proceed as follows: in Section II
we present a general discussion of the sources and impediments to the full realization of the 
opportunities for technology change in the developing countries, broken down into external 
factors (i.e. foreign patents, openness to trade, the role of the
in
e
and South Korea – is then broug
witnessed a relatively stronger performanc
III we summarize and discuss s   
  6
 
II. Sources and Impediments 
A.  External Sources and Impediments 
1) Openness to Trade and FDI 
  A cursory look at the relative economic performance of rich and poor countries 
highlights, in many cases, large income and productivity gaps between the developed and 
developing worlds.  It is well understood, by neo-classical and new growth theorists alike, t
total factor productivity, with all its shortcomings, is the best measure of technology change and
has the dominant influence on an econ
hat 
 




particular,  suffered from muc later, 
                                                   
TFP estimates provided by UNIDO
7 and try to understand what lies behind them.  We also 
acknowledge the well-known weaknesses of the TFP variable which constitutes a residual 
containing considerable “noise,” e.g. economies of scale, terms of trade effects and the like, in 
addition to pure technology change.   
  While our data set was not large enough to render it meaningful, we tried panel analysis
with exports, FDI, investment, R&D, regular patents, and utility models on the right-hand side.  
Only patents, investment and exports proved significant, at the 5% level.   We moreover don’t
claim to present a behavioral model here but to restrict ourselves to observing differential 
country trends over time.  Nor do we assert that such correlations imply causation.  As our six 
country data indicate (see Figure 1), a particular country’s openness to trade seems to be highly 
correlated with technology change.  Four of our countries, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan and
Korea, initially enjoyed relatively high TFP growth. Later on, the Latin American countries, in 
h lower rates of technology change, while China and, still 
      




8  The 
impact of a country’s relative openness to trade is clearly  by no means limited to the importation 
of machinery; it focuses heavily on the transfer of knowledge.  Keller notes that foreign research 
and development (R&D) has been shown to substantially raise domestic TFP in LDCs, with 
greater rates of trade and global openness permitting technology diffusion via FDI. 
India, joined the other East Asian countries.   On the other hand, except in the case of China, and
to a lesser extent, Korea, FDI does not seem to have had much of an impact on TFP.   
  Keller (2004) argues that, overall, foreign sources of technology account for about 90% 
of the growth in most countries, and further notes that worldwide technology change is 
determined in large part by technology diffusion carried by trade and FDI across bor
 
                                                        




Sources:  UNIDO, World Productivity Database; United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity 
Trade Database; UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment Database; Republic of Taiwan, National 
Statistics. 
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  Trade with more technologically advanced countries can, of course, be beneficial to 
LDCs in that it affords them access to frontier technologies without having to invest a great deal 
of time and resources into developing such technologies on their own.  But the key is the extent 
to which such frontier technologies are adapted to the local context.  Moreover, it is not only the 
importing of technologies that can be beneficial to LDCs; in some cases, exporting may be 
advantageous as well.  Several studies have noted that there may be “learning-by-doing” effects 
that make exporters relatively more productive than their non-exporting counterparts, in 
particular due to their interactions with Northern consumers.  However, since Northern 
consumers usually have different quality standards from Southern consumers, adaptation to the 
domestic market is essential.  This applies centrally to technology change of the product 
adaptation variety, the main focus of entrepreneurs, as well as to the process adaptation type, 
focused on by most academic economists.  Frances Stewart early on stressed the importance of 
selecting the appropriate commodity attributes as an important contribution to technology change 
in the South.
9    
  One of the impediments in this part of the conceptual arena is the threat of protectionism, 
especially at a time of overall economic weakness. Currently, while a repeat of the massive 
“beggar thy neighbor” policies of the 1930’s is not on offer, there are disturbing signs of “under 
the radar” mercantilist measures being implemented, including a rise in anti-dumping measures, 
“buy domestic” legislation, and the like.   
  Turning to FDI, Borensztein et al
10 point out that human development, in the form of 
education levels (see below) is a prerequisite for a country to take full advantage of these 
          
tewart, F. and  J. James (1982)    9 S
10 Borensztein (1998)    
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etc.) of the LDC in question.  I
                                                
inflows.  Similarly, Xu
11 notes a positive relationship between FDI and TFP but that this 
relationship is stronger in middle income (and middle HDI) countries.  Moreover, the positive 
spillovers from FDI are more pronounced in high-technology, rather than low-technology, 
sectors.  Larraín, Lopez-Calva, and Rodríguez-Claré (2001) emphasize the potential benefits 
from FDI with respect to technological progress.  They present the case of Intel, a manufacturer 
of microprocessors, and its involvement in Costa Rica, a country that is “very small…when 
compared with other potential locations for a company of that nature.”
12  The presence of Intel in 
Costa Rica generated large positive spillovers in terms of increased rates of technology diffusion.  
These positive gains were accomplished through two avenues: Intel funded schools that taught 
workers technical and vocational skills, which were not necessarily Intel-specific.  Secondly, 
Intel’s FDI served as a signaling mechanism: by making such a large and profitable investment 
in Costa Rica, Intel effectively signaled others to invest in Costa Rica.  One of the frequently 
encountered impediments is the expansive definition of “strategic sectors” in which FDI is not 
admitted. 
  However, FDI can be a two-edged sword, i.e. both a source and an impediment to the 
generation of domestic TFP changes.  As Keller (2004) emphasizes, multi-national companies 
can stimulate technological learning through labor training and reduced turnover, and through 
the provision of high quality intermediate inputs.
13  However, it should also be noted that their 
real contribution cannot be assessed independently of time and place,
14  i.e. it must be related to 
the particular phase of an LDC’s life cycle, as well as to the type (size, resource endowment, 
n the idealized scenario, the multinational corporation begins as a 
           
11 Xu (2000) 
12 Larraín, Lopez-Calva, and Rodríguez-Claré (2001)  197. 
13 Keller (2004) 
14 Ranis (1976)    
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wholly-owned subsidiary, then becomes a joint venture, and finally gives way to licensing, 
management contracts, etc. as the country matures.  In this idealized world, a 
disinvestment/transformation timeframe would be agreed upon ex ante, in order to make the 
eventual transition easier.  While the multinational corporation can be particularly helpful to the 
developing country in the early stages of its independence, in particular during the customary 
import substitution subphase of its development, in such an ideal world FDI would continue to  
be supportive when the LDC moves out of this subphase.   
  However, departures from the above idealized scenario have sometimes prevented this 
relationship from working well in practice.  First, in the absence of any changes in the nature of 
the initial contract, the relationship between the two parties is likely to become less advantageous 
for the LDC and more advantageous for the multinational corporation over time.  Under most 
arrangements, the multinational corporation is likely to enjoy a monopoly-like position, and 
consequently behaves as a “satisficer.”  This means it may adversely affect technology change 
by promoting inappropriate “luxury goods,” and “luxury processes,” encouraging local 
consumers to conform their tastes and attitudes toward internationally specified rather than 
appropriate or adaptive domestic goods and local producers toward inappropriate technologies.  
The multinational corporation may also restrict entry to would-be local competitors and prevent 
their subsidiaries from entering the export market which could threaten market sharing 
arrangements with other MNCs.  Frances Stewart raised early warning signals concerning the 
two-edged sword feature of FDI and suggested that more attention be paid to South-South trade 
and investment contacts.
15  Given the march of globalization since she wrote, as well as the 
       
15 See especially Chapter 7 in her 1977 volume Technology and Underdevelopment, op. cit.    
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emergence of a substantial number of dynamic middle income countries, her early warnings and 
suggestions have been fully borne out by recent events. 
  Keller (2004) illuminates another potential departure from the evolutionary ideal between 
the host country and the corporation.  He describes two common avenues of technology transfer: 
one, the corporation’s subsidiary disseminates technology and information to domestic firms in 
the host country (and thus assists with the diffusion of possibly inappropriate international 
technology); or two, the subsidiary picks up adaptive technologies from local LDC firms (and 
then “sources” such technology outward to third parties.).  Such detrimental patterns may occur 
because the multinational corporation subsidiary is likely to have more market power than the 
average domestic firm and may thus be better at sourcing or because it has been set up with the 
express purpose of sourcing in the first place.
16   
2) Foreign Patents 
  Economists and politicians alike have long touted intellectual property rights including 
trademarks, patents, and copyrights, as integral to technological progress and economic 
development.  The authors of the 2001 Human Development Report noted that intellectual 
property rights are intimately intertwined with technology change and growth because they make 
it possible for individual innovators to reap an assured return on their initial R&D investment.
17  
Given the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 
the debate over the implementation of such rights in developing countries has been sharpened, 
and the potential benefits and impediments to their successful execution have come into clearer  
focus. 
                                                        
16 Keller (2004), 769. 
17 UNDP (2001), 102.    
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  With respect to foreign patents, for example, it has been emphasized that, in addition to 
incentivizing innovation, patents can serve as a stimulus for the transfer of technology from 
developed to developing countries.  However, just as patents can stimulate technology change, 
they can also serve as a barrier to the provision of socially valuable goods at a socially 
appropriate cost.  The 2001 Human Development Report cites, as an example, the development 
of antiretroviral drugs, as indicative of the potential social costs associated with patents.  
Antiretroviral therapy, which has dramatically cut AIDS deaths in industrial countries, remains 
an extremely expensive cocktail that has been produced under U.S. and European patents for 
some time.  Before the introduction of generic versions of these drugs, the cocktail was simply 
unaffordable by the majority of HIV-positive individuals in the LDC’s.  Still, while 
pharmaceutical companies in the developed countries, which have much larger research and 
development budgets and are thus able to develop large number of new drugs, are protected 
financially by intellectual property rights, life-saving medication has generally been too 
expensive for individuals in the countries that need it the most. 
  In addition to incentivizing risk-taking and sparking innovation, established intellectual 
property rights can encourage an increased flow of FDI associated with patents.  While some 
scholars note that this in and of itself may encourage an over-reliance on developed countries 
and thus decrease domestic innovation in LDCs, others note that the flow of ideas and 
technologies incorporated in foreign patents can definitely be helpful in generating recipient 
country TFP.  As figure 2 indicates, TFP change moves with foreign patents, especially in the 
case of the three East Asian countries.    
  14
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Sources:  World Intellectual Property Organization; UNIDO, World Productivity Database; 
Republic of Taiwan, National Statistics; United Nations Statistical Division; Taiwan Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
  Of course, there exist legitimate concerns with respect to formalizing intellectual property 
(IP)rights in the developing world.  The first is a problem of coordination. Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (2001) note that, while most developing nations agree that intellectual property rights 
are necessary, at least in theory, in practice a prisoner’s dilemma may exist, particularly in the 
early stages of development. They note that LDCs acknowledge that IP rights can encourage the 
flow of ideas and technologies from North to South, and that more formal IP rights in LDCs may 
even encourage developed countries to devise new technologies that are more appropriate for use 
in LDC environments.  However, each LDC may hesitate to be the first one to enforce IP rights 
while other  LDCs take advantage of the new technologies.  Acemoglu and Zilibotti point out 
that the existence of this prisoner’s dilemma suggests that there may be a role for a third-party,    
  16
Brazil, which are likely to pro
                                                       
e.g. an international institution, to coordinate intellectual property rights in the developing world 
to overcome this coordination failure.
18  
  Another more serious concern surrounding intellectual property rights is that their actual 
implementation can be at odds with the LDC’s public interest.  Since individual developed 
country innovators face incentives to develop new technologies relevant to their large home 
markets where they are guaranteed to earn a profit on their investments (through patents, 
copyrights, etc.), their actions may hurt technology change abroad.  For example, in many cases 
foreign patents restrict other LDC technology entry, protect their markets against local 
enterprise, restrict exports, or permit firms to charge too high a price for their product.  Ranis 
(1979) notes an example of this phenomenon, in which the granting of patents in the Colombian 
pharmaceutical industry presented a threat to the development of the local industry, “not only [by 
failing] to promote foreign investment, but [also by forcing] the sale of local firms to 
transnationals.”
19  In this case, while the granting of patents encouraged the flow of ideas and 
technologies across borders, it also represented an obstacle for domestic Colombian 
pharmaceutical firms and hurt Colombian consumers. 
  Moving from the general to the more specific issue of TRIPS implementation leads us to 
another concern associated with patents, namely, that it has been extremely difficult to enforce 
the provisions of the TRIPS agreement fairly across LDCs.  Different national situations, i.e. 
distinctive cultures and diverse national legislative systems and policies make it extraordinarily 
challenging to even-handedly execute the terms of the agreement.  The 2001 Human 
Development Report noted that, while TRIPS may benefit middle-income countries such as 
fit from the increased local innovation resulting from intellectual 
 
18 Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) 
19 Ranis (1979), 36.    
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property rights legislation, poorer LDCs that lack formal innovation structures and institutional 
mechanisms have faced higher costs without counterbalancing benefits.  As to the future, a  
differential application of TRIPS to developing countries, depending on their stage of 
development, would seem to make sense on a permanent basis (currently there is only a time 
delay granted before full application goes into effect).  It is no accident that the more successful 
LDCs of East Asia were intellectual property “pirates” until they began to become concerned 
about their own IP rights being infringed upon by the next wave of emerging economies. 
 
B.  Internal Sources and Impediments 
  The existence of an international advanced country technology frontier clearly dominates 
the opportunities for technology change in the typical developing country.  Yet making 
appropriate  choices on what to adapt, how to adapt, and what to reject is critical and 
differentiates the more from the less successful countries in the developing world  and that, in 
turn, depends largely on the quality and quantity of relevant domestic activities. 
 
1)  Domestic Patents and Utility Models 
Technology transfer, with adaptation, clearly presents a unique opportunity.  As new 
technologies are devised abroad, the adaptation of these new processes or products can decrease 
capital-labor ratios, make more efficient use of a relatively unskilled labor force, and offer 
consumers new product attributes that align more closely with their preferences and tastes – all 
developments that can lead to a sustained increase in TFP, and hence growth.  But the emphasis 
must be on the extent to which imported technologies are converted into technologies 
appropriate to the new environment,   i.e. the quality of that adaptation process.  Echoing Frances    
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geographic, render the implem
                                                  
Stewart’s early work, we are emphasizing here the importance of the adaptation of transferred 
technologies.
20   
The equilibrium state is that the development of most new technologies at the “frontier” 
occurs first in those countries or regions where the human skill level and technical capacity 
required are superior – i.e. in the developed countries.  It is accepted theory and practice that 
LDCs should to some extent rely on these more advanced countries (including increasingly some 
middle income countries in the South), and thus avoid the cost of research and development that 
went into the generation of those technologies.  However, as Frances Stewart insisted, the 
transplantation of new technologies is only step one and can lead to insufficient or 
inappropriately biased adaptations, and such inappropriate adaptations could entail heavy 
opportunity costs for LDCs.  While the factor proportions used to produce a given quality 
product differ substantially between a typical Northern and Southern country, the difference is 
typically much smaller than the gap in their endowments.  With the proper type of adaptation to 
local conditions, LDCs can reap the benefits of developed countries’ investments in the invention 
process without having to incur relatively large opportunity costs.  The success of this effort 
depends in large part on domestic patents and domestic R&D, both formal and informal. 
Pack and Westphal (1986) address essentially the same concern related to the 
“tradability” of technology, noting that it is only partially tradable: that is, an individual LDC’s 
capability to make perfect use of new knowledge and new technologies is, at best, uncertain.  
They assert that this is because technology is often tacit and the problems of communication and 
organizational differences, especially given long distances, institutional and cultural more than 
entation of adaptation difficult.  Moreover, because technological 
       
20 Stewart, F. (1977) op cit.    
  19
                                                       
elements are only partially tradable, they may require complementary institutional investments.
21  
Domestic patents and utility models may be useful in converting tacit into explicit technical 
knowledge.  Foreign patents are likely to induce domestic patents, and domestic patents in turn 
are likely to induce utility model patents
22 (where they legally exist).  As Figure 3 shows, the 
utility model is dominant in Korea and Taiwan and seems to have a high correlation with TFP 
growth, while, somewhat surprisingly, we may note a close relationship in the case of domestic 
patents for Brazil and Mexico – perhaps due to their relatively more closed economies. Late-
comer China catches up quickly in deploying the utility model.  In a given industry what is 
frequently observed is a sequencing, from the licensing of foreign patents, to an increase in 
domestic patents, followed by a burst of the utility model which is especially helpful to medium 
and small-scale firms.  
 
21 P
22 A low threshold, short protection type of patent 
























Sources:  WIPO; UNIDO; Republic of Taiwan, National Statistics; UNSD; TIPO    
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Where the intellectual property rights regime is weak, individuals and firms face fewer 
incentives to innovate because they lack formal mechanisms by which to reap returns on their 
investment.  Due to the fact that patents grant a firm (or an individual) a temporary monopoly 
position, firms are able to recoup the costs of their initial investments, as well as earn a profit, by 
setting a price above their marginal costs.  However, if formal intellectual property rights are not 
put in place, this quasi-monopoly position disappears.  In this situation, firms are not guaranteed 
to recover the costs of their initial investments, let alone earn a profit from their new 
technologies.  Thus, formal intellectual property rights increase the incentives for risk-taking by 
guaranteeing a financially “secure” outcome after the initial investment.   
 
2)  Domestic Investment 
  Clearly an important domestic source of TFP growth is domestic investment which is 
required to “carry” technology, whether changes in TFP are theoretically viewed as exogenous or 
endogenous.  Using data on gross capital formation
23 as the best measure of the domestic 
investment rate (see Figure 4), we may note a closer positive relationship between TFP growth 
and the investment rate in the case of Mexico than in some of the other country cases depicted. 
  The experience of China and India indicates that high investment rates are not necessarily 
associated with high rates of TFP growth.  This may be the result of “over-investing” resulting 
from very high savings rates, plus an emphasis – especially in the case of China – on maintaining 
extremely high growth rates and the resulting declines in the rate of return to capital and rising 




at much lower levels of the investment rate.  There appears little relationship between TFP 
growth and investment in the cases of Korea and Brazil.    
   
3) Secondary Education Choice, S&T Personnel and R&D 
“New growth” theorists  stress the importance of human development, specifically 
education, in developing nations, arguing that it improves the absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms.  In this context, “absorptive capacity” refers to the firm’s ability to successfully select and 
adapt foreign technology.  They argue that in order for technologies to be appropriately adapted, 
workers must possess a basic skill level.  These educational requirements of course change over 
time, with increased emphasis on vocational secondary education and, subsequently, science and 
technology oriented education (see Figure 5).
24  An East Asia/Latin America contrast holds for 
Science and Technology (S&T) personnel and for the role of secondary vocational education, 
though data on the latter is deficient. 
                                                        
24 We here substitute highly correlated GDP growth for TFP growth.      
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5.  Internal Sources:  S&T personnel, R&D expenditure, vocational education 
 













 Figure  5c       Figure  5d 
 
 Figure  5e      Figure  5f    
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Sources:  UNESCO, UNSD; Republic of Taiwan, National Statistics   
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technologies, which he cites as
                                                
  Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) add that the skill level of workers in individual developing 
countries can largely explain relative productivity differences and income gaps between the 
developed and developing world.  They argue that, even when all countries have access to the 
same technology, there will still be income gaps and large cross-country differences due to the 
relatively less-skilled LDC labor force.  Since most R&D investment takes place in developed 
countries, the technologies that result from that investment will naturally yield “North-biased” 
technologies.  Workers who are less conventionally skilled will thus not be able to make 
effective use of such imported technologies.  If the Northern bias in favor of skill-intensive 
technologies continues, LDCs may be increasingly  inclined to reject frontier technologies and 
miss an opportunity to adapt them to their own needs and demands. To avoid this from 
happening requires general scientific, vocational and technical literacy, not copying the 
educational system of the North.  By encouraging timely investments in education, particularly 
with respect to programs that aim to improve the skill level of the average LDC worker,  it 
becomes possible for LDCs to encourage the appropriate adaptation of imported technologies.  
Accordingly, the consensus in the literature is that the universal attainment of primary 
and, later, secondary education should be a goal for LDCs.  Stewart has insisted that vocational 
and technical education at the secondary level be encouraged
25.    Indeed, an important issue is 
the distinction between education and associated R&D efforts which are mainly science-based or 
empirically-based.  The former is defined as “technology that arises from a change in our basic 
understanding of the laws governing the environment,” and the latter as “technology that arises 
after trial-and-error.”
26  Ranis cautions against an over-reliance on empirically-based 
 a contributing factor for the relative decline of Britain’s 
           
25 Stewart (1977 ) 
26 Ranis (1978)    
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spinning industries and argue 
                                                  
economic growth and performance in the years after World War I, following its earlier industrial 
success.  Many new technologies in developing countries arise as the result of “tinkering” – for 
example, so-called “blue collar” R&D in textiles, metal working, brick making and beer brewing  
led to early TFP advances in Japan which did not need to rely on basic scientific advances but 
made use of its abundant labor supply.  Britain was the pioneer.  Germany, as a follower, facing 
natural resources scarcity,  focused on post-Liebig research labs and engineering schools and  
outdistanced everyone else in the chemical/pharmaceutical, iron and steel, and electrical 
machinery industries by devising new technologies based on a fundamental understanding of 
science.  The U.S. endowment favored empirically-based change, and mass as opposed to niche 
production.  As Kuznets points out, the capacity to use science wisely, and the capacity to absorb 
science as a necessary basis for importing and adapting technology, is related to the education 
system and to the types of interventions, either direct or indirect, practiced by governments.  An 
education system that imparts a modicum of scientific understanding to a substantial portion of 
the population can provide basic building blocks for a discriminating science capacity at a 
relatively early stage of a country’s development.  Moreover, as the examples of Japan and the 
United States illustrate, the same country may, further along in its development, itself acquire the 
capacity to advance the frontiers of science and directly contribute to the frontier. Higher 
education relevant to more advanced technologies becomes crucial at a later stage. 
  That new empirically based technologies in the North can have an extraordinary impact 
on total factor productivity in the South has been demonstrated time and time again throughout 
history.  Otsuka et al
27, for example, refer to the example of the Indian and Japanese cotton 
that a substantial increase in TFP in Japan in the late-19
th century 
       
27 Otsuka, Ranis, Saxonhouse (1985)    
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occurred as the direct result of the utilization of an imported technology – the ring – to replace an 
old one – the mule.  In contrast to its Indian counterpart, the Japanese cotton spinning industry 
witnessed a “virtually instantaneous switch from mules to rings” in the space of two years (1887-
1889), which, in turn, prompted major adaptations in such ancillary processes as higher speeds of 
machinery utilization, the introduction of cotton-mixing, and the employment of more women to 
repair broken threads.  The authors attribute an overall decline in the capital-labor ratio around 
the turn of the century to the industry’s switch to the ring and its subsequent labor-using 
adaptation processes. By contrast, India imported two million new mules between 1883 (the date 
of the first Indian experimentation with rings) and 1900, for cultural reasons failed to include 
women in the labor force, and did not use cotton mixing to decrease its reliance on mule 
technology.  As a consequence, Japanese-owned mills in China, a market previously owned by 
Indian exporters, expanded capacity more than eightfold between 1915 and 1928, and the 
number of Japanese-owned looms increased 15 times over the same period.  Domestic adaptive 
R&D in Japan was clearly superior to that in India.  The Indian colonial managing agency 
system focused on output quotas instead of profits and thus did not provide the necessary 
incentives. 
  Keller (2004) notes that countries with higher levels of expenditure on R&D experience 
higher rates of productivity growth because such expenditures are critical for appropriate 
adaptive responses to international technology.  Only 5% of the world’s formal R&D is 
expended by the developing countries and the typical LDC spends 0.5% of its GDP in this 
fashion, compared to 5% for developed countries.  The East Asian economies spend between 
1.5% to 3.0% of their GDP on official R&D while the Latin American countries fall below 1%.  
Firms in LDCs often lack tax or other  incentives to invest privately or to take advantage of    
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public sector R&D opportunities.  The adequacy of domestic R&D in the context of generating 
TFP hinges on fiscal incentives,  institutional innovations, as well as education strategies. 
  The incentives faced by firms to invest in R&D differ depending on the size and market 
position of the firms in question.  For large firms with a relative monopoly position, there may 
exist the ability but a low incentive to innovate; i.e. the firm is either maximizing profits or 
coming as close as possible to doing so, and thus has no reason to find a new or efficient means 
of doing what they have already “perfected.”  More likely, it is “satisficing” and prefers the 
stability of “the quiet life”.  In successful LDCs, it is in small- and medium-scale firms in 
relatively competitive industries that most significant R&D activity takes place.  Institutional 
innovations, including the establishment of R&D institutes, providing access to smaller 
entrepreneurs on a temporary basis, have been very helpful to such firms which can’t afford 
major organized R&D efforts in the most successful countries, e.g. ITRI in Taiwan. The more 
competitive environment faced by these firms usually encourages them to find appropriate 
adaptive responses. The existence of the utility model patent can also be very helpful in this 
regard since much R&D may be carried out in the form of “tinkering,” i.e. blue collar or informal 
activities on factory floors and in repair shops, including “reverse engineering,” all of which is 
not captured in the official formal R&D statistics.  For example, an LDC may reap a higher 
payoff from an imported machine if it is tested, used, and redesigned by workers on the factory 
floor to suit the special needs of the local environment.   
  The emphasis should clearly be on adaptive rather than basic R&D.  Julian Engel sees 
“little justification [in developing countries] for basic research except for sustaining a viable 
teaching effort and keeping your best brains at home.”
28  Most observers agree that the biggest 
 
28 In Ranis (1978).    
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waste of all is second-rate basic research and instead advocate flexible economic environments 
plus science and technical education focused on indigenous improvements and adaptations.  
However, to neglect basic science-focused R&D entirely may be going too far, particularly in 
agriculture and health.  Without such research on a country or regional basis, Green Revolution  
technology in agriculture, for example, would not have had the necessary sustaining power and 
the necessary defense against specific local problems (such as pests and disease).  Similarly, in 
the field of health, few people would argue that one transnational science can really be equally 
responsive to the very different conditions around the globe.  Even in some industries, some 
attention to science-based R&D may be helpful, e.g. in footwear production, depending on 
different cowhide tanning procedures, or in textile industry, depending on different humidity 
requirements.  In such areas, minimal scientific literacy is necessary to respond to technological 
problems, even as an LDC is ill-advised to “show the flag” in an array of frontier science 
endeavors. 
  The benefits of investment in educating and retaining adaptively-motivated science and 
technology (S&T) personnel domestically, rather than risk losing such individuals to developed 
nations with strong programs and more formal education and research structures, are substantial.  
In the East Asian countries that have experienced success the building up of S&T personnel was 
a priority.  Japan stands as an example of technical education put to good use, noted for its  
mastery of reverse engineering, for achieving appropriate adaptation by carefully analyzing 
imported machinery’s structure, function, and operation, and changing key elements in 
consonance with local factor and institutional endowments.  Some contemporary LDCs, e.g. in 
Latin America, typify some of the impediments in this area, e.g. by their relative emphasis on    
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academic over vocational education at the secondary level and on the humanities over science 
and engineering at the tertiary level. 
 
III.  Summary and Some Conclusions for Policy 
  Our six country comparison in its various dimensions indicated that while the world is 
grey, rather than black and white, there are marked differences in the extent to which East Asia, 
in contrast to Latin America – with South Asia in an intermediate position – took advantage of 
technological opportunities and reduced some of the obstacles.  While most economists agree 
that R&D is the major source of technology change because it permits adaptation to take place, it 
is clearly subject to perceptible underinvestment, especially in Latin America, when compared to 
Asia.  With increased cheap flows of information and technology now possible across borders, it 
has become much easier for new technologies to be both imported and exported across the globe.  
Thus, opportunities are mushrooming but are not being sufficiently  utilized.  Some progress has 
clearly been made, i.e. basic research and development has given way to increased emphasis on 
adaptive research and development, with the need for country-specific R&D clearly evident.  
Frances Stewart has rightly maintained from the beginning that R&D is “the dominant source of 
innovation today,” and that adaptive R&D in particular is critical for LDCs to develop their own 
appropriate technologies and avoid over-reliance on inappropriate imports from the developed 
world.
29   
Yet we should recognize that impediments continue to exist to repairing the current LDC 
underinvestment in R&D even if we could account for  the “blue collar” R&D not reflected in 
the available data.  Most economists agree that current tax code-embedded R&D programs tend 
                                                        
29 Stewart (1981)    
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to benefit larger firms.  Moreover, there has been a lack of institutional commitment to R&D 
among bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.  When and where successful R&D programs do 
exist, the dissemination of relevant knowledge remains problematic. Complementary human 
capital investments are required to take full advantage of the potential for adaptive technology 
change.  To remedy this, Stewart offers a few suggestions for R&D policy, including the 
promotion of “appropriate” technology choices by aid agencies, as well as the creation of new 
R&D partnerships incentivized by tax credits and public grants. In this way, she argues that basic 
(or “old-style”) R&D will no longer be effective, and considerable investment in adaptive R&D  
should be undertaken.  In a similar vein, Ranis suggests that government support of R&D 
institutions that cater to S&M firms be set on a long-term, gradually-declining subsidy basis in 
order to ensure their focus on private sector “appropriate adaptation” activity rather than the 
pursuit of international academic or scientific interests. 
Determining appropriate responses to R&D underinvestment and designing effective 
R&D programs requires an understanding of where the individual developing country’s basic 
research needs end, and where the caveats against a wasteful buckshot approach begin to take 
hold.  While this is not an easy matter on which to pontificate, the burden of proof must be on 
those who would like to initiate advanced university training and basic research, including some 
obligation to demonstrate a flexible, time-phased relevance to sustained technology change.  This 
may seem like the typical hardheaded, narrow economist’s prescription.  What about the 
importance of those many possible interconnections, decades apart, that may flow, in some 
entirely unpredictable way, from what looks like an unconnected intellectual pursuit?  Without 
disparaging these possibilities, we should be offended by the spectacle of open-heart surgery 
research in countries where malnutrition is prevalent and insist that basic research should not    
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expect to be outside the realm of some flexible, sophisticated version of cost/benefit analysis.  
Such analysis must try to balance the potential benefits against the possible alternative 
allocations of scarce financial and, undoubtedly even more important, human resources.  The 
higher risks of science, due partly to the uncertainty of predicting future two-way interactions 
between science and technology, and partly to the likely inappropriability on a national scale of 
any such “returns,” render this task unusually difficult.  But analysis must still be done; an act of 
faith does not suffice. 
  In addition to placing the burden of proof on those who would like to have developing 
countries pay the “price of admission” in a given field of basic R&D, it might be possible, 
although admittedly difficult, to encourage much more specialization within, and possibly also 
among, countries on a regional basis.  This type of agreement has been reached, for example, in 
European atomic energy and ballistics research and in African efforts to combat yellow fever and 
rinderpest regionally –  that is, where the required scale and the need to avoid expensive 
duplication were sufficient to overcome nationalistic jealousies.  Although the record on similar 
agreements among developing countries in the field of common market investment allocations, 
for instance, has not been very encouraging, it has been somewhat better with respect to the use 
of regional training institutes and research organizations, i.e. whenever regionalism is not forced  
but flows from the recognition of a mutual self-interest.  
  If we agree that no developing country can really afford to be either a full-time borrower 
of science or an across-the-board contributor to it, the same holds for the hamlet of our piece, 
domestic human development as expressed in terms of appropriate education levels.  When we 
speak about a society’s national capacity to utilize and modify basic science creatively, we are 
really referring to a human capacity to make appropriate adaptations to a different environment.     
  34
Contributions to human knowledge that break new ground and provide scope for major new 
technological breakthroughs will, with few exceptions, probably remain the province of the 
North for the time being. 
  What can we say about the direction that new science-intensive and engineering-intensive 
frontier technology is likely to take?  The two elements that seem most responsible for this 
direction are changing resource endowments and changing public policy.  The very different 
historical behavior of the natural resources-rich, labor-scarce United States relative to a relatively 
capital-scarce England and a Germany that felt cramped for natural resources should be 
instructive in this respect.  Engineering-intensive technology took a different, more capital-
intensive path in the wide-open spaces of the United States than in England.  And in Germany, 
metallurgical science responded to the demands of an iron ore with high phosphorous content; 
official encouragement of the entire chemical industry was based on the felt need to overcome, 
by artificial and synthetic shortcuts, the relative unkindness of nature.  Japan, after first exploring 
its abundant labor resources – and taking an engineering-intensive route analogous to that of the 
United States - has, with the disappearance of its labor surplus, tended to place more of its eggs 
in electronics and other high-technology baskets. 
  While government policies cannot legislate away the basic endowment of a society, they 
can, if flexible and able to overcome national sectional interests, provide important assistance to 
the transition effort of a developing economy as its resource endowment and institutional 
capacity change over time.  Analogously, if dominated by narrow vested interests and/or lacking 
in historical perspective, such policies can attempt to draw a veil over the endowment and lead 
the system into expensive scientific/technological dead ends and economic stagnation.  While 
there is no rigid unidirectional sequence of phases that every developing country must follow on    
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the path to mature growth, some attention to the changing roles of science and technology in 
terms of a changing resource endowment and, especially, changing human capabilities is 
essential in all but the most unusual cases. 
  At the micro and institution-building levels, the appropriate role of government in the 
mixed economy context is not unrelated to the appropriability or nonappropriability of the new 
knowledge acquired.  Investment in basic science carries a high risk, in part because of its, at 
best, indirect and long-term relationship with technology and growth, but also partly because it is 
generally an international good not even appropriable by a country, not to speak of any private 
party within a country.  As we move from basic international science to changes in technology, 
risks are reduced and private appropriability becomes much more important.  As the extent of 
appropriability rises, so, normally, does the level of private R&D expenditures. 
  A perceptible trend has been for the typical LDC, in the early stages of its independence, 
to rely on import substitution policies in an attempt to assert its post-colonial economic 
independence by beefing up its domestic industry.  However, these policies also often did harm 
to local industry by making it less competitive and greatly decreased the incentive to innovate, as 
firms were protected by tariffs, price controls, and foreign exchange rationing.  When guaranteed 
unearned profits, producers have less incentive to find new technologies and innovation is 
stifled.  Firms are content to protect their quasi-monopoly position and adopt “satisficing 
behavior.”  While such policies may be necessary at early stages of an LDC’s development, there 
is always the danger that some bad habits persist.  For example, some countries still prohibit the 
importation of second-hand machinery.  Ultimately openness to trade and to the transfer of 
technology via patents and FDI can provide opportunities in the direction of generating 
appropriate technology change.  Stewart has argued that the objectives of a firm can be changed    
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by influencing the environment in which decision-makers operate.  By removing the quasi-
monopoly protection that import substitution policies provide domestic decision-makers, it is 
possible to influence performance in an innovative direction. 
  In order to ensure a successful and mutually beneficial relationship between an LDC and 
the multinational corporation, the multinational corporation should ideally be disaggregated into 
its component parts.  Most misunderstandings occur because of the mystique of the powerful, 
footloose MNC, bargaining with the poor, optionless LDC, the latter being pressured to buy what 
is essentially a “pig in a poke.”  The capital, technology, management, and entrepreneurship 
components of any deal should be spelled out as fully as possible and each component priced 
out.  Screening procedures that exist in virtually every LDC should concentrate more on such 
disaggregation and full disclosure, thus permitting comparative shopping and other than “all or 
nothing” acceptances or rejections.  Fade-out and divestiture agreements can be negotiated much 
more intelligently ab initio which might, for example, provide for a transition from the wholly-
owned subsidiary to the joint venture form after ten years, and possibly further reassessments in 
the direction of licensing or management contracts thereafter.  
We must, of course, contend with the argument that it is unlikely that multinational firms 
will be willing to play this game because, from their point of view, they helped create formidable 
competition for themselves in return for relatively meager and diminishing returns.”
30  Clearly, if 
offered more at every stage they will seek more.  If, however, there is a clear and anticipated 
transition from one stage (and one bundle) to another within a particular LDC, competitive 
pressures among the MNCs should assert themselves to dictate a willingness to accept 
reasonable rates of return.  In this we would be safer in relying on the MNC’s long-run profit 
 
30 Ranis (1976), 112    
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objective rather than on some public spirited impulse.  Negotiations should recognize that it is 
mutually better to plan on living together under changing rules than to attempt to deny the 
declining value of some major MNC components over time, thus inviting expropriation or other 
retaliatory actions.  The burden of proof would have to be on the side of those, like Raymond 
Vernon,
31 who claim to see a general tendency for a broadening and deepening relative role for 
the MNC over time. 
LDC screening procedures governing MNC presence could be modified in the direction 
of greater automaticity, greater predictability and more built-in flexibility over time.  Such 
procedures should reflect a recognition that some of the excesses of the MNC, ranging from 
transfer pricing to the payment of prematurely high wages, to the inappropriateness of the 
technology selected, to the underutilization of patents and the overutilization of domestic credit 
and export prohibition clauses, are clearly related to the overall policy environment of the 
recipient LDC.  The MNC can be effectively forced to put its energies into building better 
mousetraps and using adaptive (usually labor-intensive) technologies.  In that case it is forced to 
give up the “quiet life” of the satisficing monopolist as the transition to a more liberal policy 
regime is effected.  MNCs are quite capable of coming up with appropriate process and product 
ideas when they are pressured to “scratch around”. 
The importance of indigenous human capabilities in determining the rate of technology 
change is reflected in the importance attached to vocational education and scientific personnel 
underpinning the nature of domestic R&D at different stages of an economy’s development.   
This very capability will serve a developing country well in determining, most importantly, its 
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domestic policies as well its attitude towards foreign patents, the multi-national company and 
foreign capital, public and private.   
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